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Chapter 1
Introduction
The present dissertation collects two essays on the theory of optimal contracts in presence
of a Costly State Verication Technology.
In the rst essay (Chapter 2), we extend the standard Costly State Verication framework in
such a way to study how the presence of pre-contractual, non-contractible investment aects
the terms of the contract between a Principal and an Agent. In particular, we will present
a model in which, before the contracting stage, an agent can invest an amount of eort to
generate a future surplus in a bilateral relationship with a principal who is endowed with a
costly auditing technology. To induce the Principal not to walk away from this relationship,
both parties sign a contract with which payments from the agent to the principal are speci-
ed. We assume that parties are asymmetrically informed: the agent is privately informed
about the state of nature and tries to exploit his informational advantage in order to give the
principal lower payments. On the other hand, the principal tries to avoid agent's fraudulent
behaviour by using (or threatening to use) the costly audit technology.
The results that we will present share some key features of both the Costly State Veri-
cation (CSV) and the hold-up literature. In particular, we will show how our optimal
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contract inherits almost all the essential characteristics of the typical optimal contract in
the CSV framework. However, there is a fundamental dierence. Due to our assumption
of relationship-specic and non-contractible investment, if the principal is not able to cred-
ibly commit to pre-specied auditing policies, then investment can no longer be used as
a commitment device. This will lead to underinvestment in eort with respect to the full
commitment case. Furthermore, we will show how dierent allocations of bargaining power
between the contracting parties may lead to the hold-up problem. In particular, we will show
that if the principal has all the bargaining power, then hold-up arises in its most severe form,
that is, no eort at all will be exerted at the pre-contractual stage. Finally, we will briey
discuss how the introduction of bonus payments in case of successful project's outcome may
mitigate the hold-up problem.
In the second essay (Chapter 3) we depart from the canonical model of costly auditing and
study the optimal contract between a lender a borrower in the case in which the verication
and reporting decisions are taken simultaneously (monitoring) and not sequentially (audit-
ing). We consider two dierent scenarios: one in which the Principal is able to fully commit
to the verication policy announced at the contracting stage and another one where such an
ability to commit is assumed away.
We will show that the optimal contract under full commitment prescribes a null expected
rent to the Agent if the low state of the world realizes along with the so-called maximum
punishment principle, that is, the Agent must give his entire wealth to the Principal if caught
cheating. Furthermore, the Agent will be left with a positive rent (bonus) if he truthfully
reports the higher state of the world. In the case without commitment, we will show that
the optimal contract will inherit all the main features of the contract under full commitment
but with two relevant dierences. First, the expected rent for the Agent in the high state
is lower. Second, the loan size acts as a commitment device and therefore turns out to be
6
larger in the case in which full commitment to verication policies is assumed away.
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Chapter 2
Costly auditing with non-contractible
investment
2.1 Introduction
The literature on Costly State Verication (CSV) that originated from the seminal contribu-
tions of [Tow79] and [GH85] has always treated loan size or investment as fully contractible
variables. In the typical scenario, a cashless entrepreneur borrows funds from a lender which
is endowed with a (perfect) costly verication (or auditing) technology. The amount of the
loan to be invested in the contractual relationship between the two agents is usually assumed
to be fully contractible.
However, we can think of many situations in the real world in which the assumption of full
contractibility happens to be too restrictive. For instance, consider1 a situation in which an
agent (e.g., a start-up inventor) can make an investment in basic research activity today in
order to generate a possible surplus tomorrow. Once the investment has been made, suppose
the agent asks a principal to participate in the project (for instance, in order to develop
1This example was inspired by [Sch12].
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a marketable innovation or nal product). Given this sequence of events2, the agent's in-
vestment turns out to be a sunk cost at the contracting stage. The literature3 has usually
interpreted a situation of this kind as an incomplete contract scenario in which parties cannot
agree upon a pre-specied investment level.
The aim of this chapter is to extend the standard CSV framework in such a way to study
how the presence of pre-contractual, non-contractible investment aects the terms of the
contract between the two parties. In particular, we will present a model in which, before the
contracting stage, an agent can invest an amount of eort to generate a future surplus in a
bilateral relationship with a principal who is endowed with a costly verication technology.
To induce the Principal not to walk away from this relationship, both parties sign a contract
with which payments from the agent to the principal are specied. We assume that parties
are asymmetrically informed: the agent is privately informed about the state of nature and
tries to exploit his informational advantage in order to give the principal lower payments.
On the other hand, the principal tries to avoid agent's fraudulent behavior by using (or
threatening to use) the costly audit technology.
The results that we will present share some key features of both the CSV and the hold-up lit-
erature. In particular, we will show how our optimal contract inherits almost all the essential
characteristics of the typical optimal contract in the CSV framework. However, there is a
fundamental dierence. Due to our assumption of relationship-specic and non-contractible
investment, if the principal is not able to credibly commit to pre-specied auditing policies,
then investment can no longer be used as a commitment device4. This will lead to under-
investment in eort with respect to the full commitment case, which is in sharp contrast to
[KP98]. Furthermore, we will show how dierent allocations of bargaining power between
the contracting parties may lead to the hold-up problem. In particular, we will show that
2This scenario is typical in the hold-up literature. See, for instance, Hart and Moore (1990).
3See [HM88] and (1999), Aghion and Tirole (1994).
4On the role of investment as a commitment device, see [KP98].
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if the principal has all the bargaining power, then hold-up arises in its most severe form,
that is, no eort at all will be exerted at the pre-contractual stage. Finally, we will briey
discuss how the introduction of bonus payments in case of successful project's outcome may
mitigate the hold-up problem.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we will describe the basic model. Then
we proceed to study the optimal contract design problem both under the assumption of full
commitment to auditing policies (Section 2.3) and under the assumption that the principal
cannot credibly commit to auditing policies in Section 2.4. The eort choice problem is stud-
ied in Section 2.5 while Section 2.6 discusses the eects of dierent allocations of bargaining
power between the two parties. Then conclusions follow.
2.2 The model
Let us consider a simple environment with two risk-neutral, expected utility maximizing
players: A (the Agent) and P (the Principal). The Agent is endowed with a risky project
for the functioning of which an investment in eort is required. A can invest an amount of
eort e 2 [0; 1] that would aect the project's outcome distribution over the set of states
S = fh; lg. In particular, the project's outcome is represented by a random variable y with
support fyh; ylg, where yh > yl  0. The high state realization yh occurs with probability e
while the low state yl occurs with probability 1  e.
Exerting eort is costly and these costs are represented by the twice continuously dieren-
tiable function  : [0; 1] ! R+ that satises  (0) = 0, lime!1   (e) = +1,  0 (0) = 0,
 0 (e) > 0 for e > 0, lime!1   0 (e) = +1, and  00 () > 0.
The investment in eort is assumed to be relationship-specic and non-contractible. Fur-
thermore, in order for the project returns to realize, agent P participation is assumed to
be necessary. Players are asymmetrically informed about the true state of the world and
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they write a contract with which payments from A to P are specied. In particular, after
investing eort e, player A privately observes the realization ys of y, where s 2 S. A makes
a report y^m to player P , where m 2 M = fh; lg. Contingent on the report, a payment
specied by the contract is made to player P . The latter can either accept the payment
or use a perfect audit technology with which he can discover the true state of the world at
cost c > 0. We also assume c < yh   yl. After auditing, payments contingent both on the
reported and the true state of the world take place. In particular, the payment functions
specied by the contract between the two parties are R (mjs) and R (mj), where R (mjs) is
the payment when y^m is reported and ys is the true state while R (mj) is the payment when
y^m is reported and no auditing occurs.
The Agent is protected by limited liability, so that R (mjs)  ys and R (mj)  y^m for
m; s = fl; hg.
The sequence of events is the following:
 Stage 1: The Agent exerts eort e 2 [0; 1]
 Stage 2: A contract specifying payments from A to P is signed
 Stage 3: A privately observes the true state of the world and sends a reports to P
 Stage 4: P decides whether to audit or not and nal payments take place
The sequence of events is
1 2 3 4
Contract
Design
Eﬀort
Choice
Output
Realization
Final
Payments
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events with pre-contractual eort
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2.3 Optimal contract with full commitment
In this section we characterize the optimal contract under the assumption that, at the con-
tracting stage, the Principal can fully commit to a pre-specied (and possibly random)
auditing policy. We denote by bC the resulting contract and we will use throughout the su-
perscript b to indicate relevant variables in the full commitment case.
A contract is a list of payment functions bR (mjs) and bR (mj) and an auditing schedule b (y^m)
contingent on the reported state y^m. bR (mjs) is the payment from party A to party P if the
state m 2 M is reported and the true state s 2 S is discovered by the Principal using the
(perfect) auditing technology he is endowed with. bR (mj) is the payment to P in the case
in which m is reported and no auditing occurs, while b (y^m) is the probability with which P
will audit the reported state m.
By standard arguments5, we can reduce the number of relevant components of the optimal
contract by noticing that the agent A's incentive to lie arises only in the case in which a
high state h realizes and, as a consequence, agent P has an incentive to audit only if a low
state l is reported, the auditing technology being costly to use.
Therefore, a contract is a list bC = nbR (lj) ; bR (ljl) ; bR (ljh) ; bR (hj) ; bo, where b is the prob-
ability with which a low state report will be audited.
Since we are working under the full commitment assumption, we can make use of the Revela-
tion Principle and then conne our attention to direct truthful mechanisms. In other words,
without loss of generality we can consider contracts for which the Agent is asked to report
his private information, i.e. the state s, and truthful reporting is optimal at equilibrium.
This implies that, given an arbitrary contract C = fR (lj) ; R (ljl) ; R (ljh) ; R (hj) ; g, agent
A expected payo is
W = e [yh  R (hj)] + (1  e) [yl   (1  )R (lj)  R (ljl)] (2.1)
5See, for instance, [KP98] and [Cho98].
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while the Principal's expected payo is
Z = eR (hj) + (1  e) [R (ljl) + (1  )R (lj)  c] : (2.2)
The optimal contract bC is the solution to the following program
Problem 1.
max
fR(mjs);R(mj);g
W
subject to
Z  0 (2.3)
R (hj)  R (ljh) + (1  )R (lj) (2.4)
R (mjs)  ys for m; s 2 fl; hg (2.5)
R (mj)  ym for m 2 fl; hg ; (2.6)
where (2.3) is P 's participation constraint, (2.4) is A's incentive compatibility (or truth-
telling) constraint, (2.5) and (2.6) are the limited liability constraints.
The solution of the maximization problem above is described in the following
Proposition 1. The contract bC = nbR (lj) ; bR (ljl) ; bR (ljh) ; bR (hj) ; bo which solves Problem
1 is such that
 bR (lj) = bR (ljl) = yl,
 bR (ljh) = yh,
 yl < bR (hj) < yh,
 b = bR(hj) yl
yh yl < 1.
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The results of Proposition 1 are standard6. It is apparent that, in order to induce truthful
reporting, the Agent is left with an expected payo equal to zero in the low state l while he
receives a positive expected rent in the high state h. Moreover, the punishment in the case
of fraudulent report is maximal, that is, bR (ljh) = yh. Finally, A's incentive compatibility
constraint is binding and b is less than 1. We will see in Section 2.6 how the latter result
crucially depends on the allocation of bargaining power between the two contracting parties.
2.4 Optimal contract without commitment
In this section we provide the full characterization of the optimal contract eC between par-
ties A and P under the assumption that, at the contracting stage, party P cannot commit
himself not to renegotiate the auditing policy announced in stage 1. We use the superscript
e to denote all relevant variables under no commitment.
The reason why we also consider the scenario without commitment rests upon the inher-
ent dynamic inconsistency of the optimal contract under full commitment. In fact, let us
consider the scenario outlined in the previous section. Once the terms of the optimal con-
tract have been agreed upon by both parties, the Agent will truthfully report the observed
state of the world and then the Principal will audit according to the equilibrium auditing
policy b. Clearly, the Principal would not have any incentive ex post to audit because he
knows for sure that A's reports are truthful and because auditing is costly. Furthermore, the
Agent may anticipate P 's incentive not to audit and then he may try to take advantage of
the Principal by sending fraudulent reports. In other words, the P 's promise to commit to
the announced policy b is not credible. Without the full commitment assumption, we thus
consider a scenario with strategic auditing and we will try to determine an optimal contract
which is also renegotiation-proof.
6See, for instance, [BS87], [MP89], and [KP98]
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Before going through the contract design problem, we study and solve the reporting game
that takes place once a given contract has been signed.
Let an arbitrary contract C = (R (mjs) ; R (mj)) be given. After signing such a contract, the
Agent privately observes the true state of the world s 2 S and then sends a message m 2M
to the Principal. The latter may then enforce the payment R (mj) without any auditing.
Alternatively, he may audit the report m 2 M at cost c > 0 to discover with certainty the
true state s 2 S and then enforce the payment R (mjs). We refer to this sequence of events
as the 'reporting game' induced by contract C.
The reporting game described above falls in the category of signalling (or sender-receiver)
games. Player A is the sender whose private information is given by the state s 2 S, that is,
A's type. A signals his type to player P by means of one out of the two messages available,
that is, m 2M .
We use behavioral strategies to describe each player's plan of action. In particular, we can de-
ne a behavioral strategy A for player A as a probability distribution (A (ys) ; 1  A (ys)),
where A (ys) is the probability of truthfully reporting the state of the world. In other words,
it is the probability of reporting y^s when ys is privately observed. A behavioral strategy P
for player P is a probability distribution (P (y^m) ; 1  P (y^m)), where P (y^m) is the prob-
ability of auditing the report y^m.
Furthermore, player P has beliefs about the true type of player A. We dene those beliefs
as  (sjm) = Prob [y = ysjy^m]. In words,  (sjm) is the posterior probability that player P
assigns to type s of player A after having received the message m 2M .
To solve the reporting game we use the standard solution concept found in the literature
on sender-receiver games, that is, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)7. A PBE is a
behavioral strategy prole (A; 

P ) and a belief system 
 (sjm) such that beliefs  (sjm)
7In our simple scenario, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium we are after will also satisfy the requirements
of the Sequential Equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson (1982). On the equivalence between PBE and
Sequential Equilibrium in our simple scenario, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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are determined by Bayes' rule whenever possible and, given those beliefs, the strategy prole
(A; 

P ) is sequentially rational.
As we already did in the full commitment scenario, we can simplify the structure of the game
by noticing that at every equilibrium both A (yl) = 1 and P (y^h) = 0 will hold. Intuitively,
the Agent will never send a high-state report y^h when a low state yl realizes because in
that case he would expect a lower payment from truthful reporting. In other words, the
incentive lo lie arises only in the case in which a high state yh realizes. On the other hand,
the Principal anticipates agent A's behavior and, since auditing is costly, he will never audit
a report y^h.
Thus a contract eC has to specify four payments: neR (ljl) ; eR (ljh) ; eR (lj) ; eR (hj)o. Clearly,
the no commitment assumption implies that any auditing policy announced by the Principal
in the contracting stage cannot be contracted upon.
To save on notation, we introduce  :=  (y^l), that is, the probability of auditing a low-income
report, and  := A (yh), that is, the probability of truthfully reporting a high-income real-
ization.
Given an arbitrary contract C = (R (mjs) ; R (mj)), player A's expected payo from C is
W = e f (yh  R (hj)) + (1  ) [ (yh  R (ljh)) + (1  ) (yh  R (lj))]g+
+ (1  e) f (yl  R (ljl)) + (1  ) (yl  R (lj))g ; (2.7)
while agent P 's expected payo is
Z = eR (hj) + (2.8)
+ (1  e) f(1  )R (lj) +  [ (hjl)R (ljh) + (1   (hjl))R (ljl)  c]g :
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As shown, among others, by [KP98] and [Cho98], the PBE we are after is a mixed strategy
equilibrium. This implies that  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1). This implies that every player
should be indierent between the pure actions that will be played with positive probability
in the corresponding equilibrium mixed strategy. Formally, the condition
 (hjl)R (ljh) + (1   (hjl))R (ljl)  c = R (lj) (2.9)
and the condition
R (ljh) + (1  )R (lj) = R (hj) (2.10)
must simultaneously hold. Note that equality (2.9) means that agent P must be indierent
between auditing and not auditing in the case in which a low state is reported. We also know
that, if the high state is reported, then P will play the pure action 'not audit' with probability
1. Equality (2.10) instead refers to player A and it means that he must be indierent between
telling a lie and telling the truth when the high state of world is observed. If the low state
is observed, then we already know that A will send the report y^l with probability 1.
As for beliefs, we can use Bayes' rule to easily obtain
 (hjl) = e (1  )
1  e (2.11)
and
 (ljl) = 1   (hjl) = 1  e
1  e : (2.12)
Using (2.11) and (2.12) in (2.9), we obtain
e = eR (ljh) + (1  e)R (ljl) R (lj)  c
e [R (ljh) R (lj)  c] : (2.13)
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From (2.10), we get
e = R (hj) R (lj)
R (ljh) R (lj) : (2.14)
Thus we can conclude that in every PBE of our reporting game, player A and player P will
randomize according to the above probabilities e and e, respectively.
Now we are ready to set up and solve the optimal contract design problem.
As we already did in the full commitment case, we assume that the Agent has all the
bargaining power and act as the contract designer. In Section 2.6 we will discuss the eect
of dierent allocations of bargaining power between the two parties.
The optimal contract design problem reads as follows:
Problem 2.
max
fR(mjs);R(mj)g
W
subject to
Z  0 (2.15)
 = e (2.16)
 = e (2.17)
R (mjs)  ys for m; s 2 fl; hg (2.18)
R (mj)  ym for m 2 fl; hg : (2.19)
Condition (2.15) is player P 's participation constraint, (2.16) and (2.17) ensure equilibrium
play in the reporting game that will start out after signing the contract, (2.18) and (2.19)
are the limited liability constraints.
The solution to Problem 2 is reported in the following
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Proposition 2. The contract eC = neR (lj) ; eR (ljl) ; eR (ljh) ; eR (hj)o which solves Problem 2
is such that:
 eR (lj) = eR (ljl) = yl,
 eR (ljh) = yh,
 yl < eR (hj) < yh.
Furthermore, the following inequalities hold:
 b  e = eR(hj) yl
yh yl < 1,
 eR (hj)  bR (hj).
The results of the Proposition above are standard8. Nonetheless, some remarks are in order.
In particular, we can argue that the contract eC share some features of bC except for a couple
of remarkable dierences. First, since the sender-receiver game induced by the contract eC
has a mixed strategy equilibrium in which e < 1, this implies that strategic default occurs
with positive probability at equilibrium. Clearly, this is in sharp contrast to the results of
the previous section, the reason being that removing the full commitment assumption does
not allow us to use the revelation principle. Second, even though the Agent is left with zero
rent in the low state also in the no commitment case, now he is called upon to give the
Principal a greater payment eR (hj). The reason is that, in order for the P 's auditing threat
to be credible, the dierence between payments eR (lj) and eR (hj) must be increased in order
to avoid pooling at the low state. Via (2.14), also the auditing probability e will be higher
at equilibrium. Finally, we can conclude that in the case of no commitment the Agent is
able to extract a smaller rent from the principal due to the higher payment eR (hj) in the
high state.
8In particular, see [Kha97], [KP98], and [Cho98].
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2.5 Investment in eort
Due to our assumption of relationship-specic, non contractible eort, player A chooses the
optimal level of eort at stage 1, that is, before the contract with player P is signed. The
Agent clearly makes his decision by anticipating his expected payo from the contract that
will be signed at stage 2. In this section we will study the eort choice problem in the case
in which parties will agree on the contract bC and also in the alternative scenario in which,
under no commitment, eC will be signed.
As a benchmark, let us consider the rst-best level of eort eFB, that is, the level of eort
that would be chosen under complete and perfect information. The Agent would solve
Problem 3.
max
e2[0;1]
eyh + (1  e) yl    (e)
and eFB would be implicitly determined by the rst-order condition
 0
 
eFB

= (yh   yl) : (2.20)
Clearly, eFB > 0 because of the assumptions yh > yl and  
0 () > 0 for e > 0.
Let us consider now the case of full commitment. The eort choice at stage 1 is determined
by the following program
Problem 4.
max
e2[0;1]
cW    (e) ;
where cW is A's expected payo from contract bC.
Analogously, in the case of no commitment, agent A solves
Problem 5.
max
e2[0;1]
fW    (e) ;
21
where fW is A's expected payo from contract eC.
The solutions to Problems 4 and 5 are summarized in the following
Proposition 3. The Agent's eort choice at stage 1 is such that
0 < e be < eFB:
Clearly, the presence of asymmetric information between the parties gives rise to underin-
vestment in eort with respect to the rs-best scenario. Furthermore, the inability to commit
cause a further decrease in the optimal level of eort with respect to the scenario under full
commitment. The reason for such an underinvestment is due to the fact that the absence of
commitment allow the Agent to extract a smaller rent from the Principal at the contracting
stage. Anticipating the resulting lower expected payo, the Agent will exert lower eort in
the no commitment case. The result is quite intuitive and is in contrast to the ndings con-
tained in [KP98]. In fact, they show that, when investment is fully contractible, the absence
of commitment to audit policies implies a higher level of investment. This is due to the fact
that the amount of investment (in [KP98], the loan size) is used to make the P 's auditing
threat credible. That is, the higher is the investment at stake in the contractual relationship
with A, the higher is the probability with which the Principal will audit fraudulent reports.
In our case, investment cannot be used as a commitment device because it is assumed to
be non-contractible. The only commitment device the Principal can use is (an increase in)
the payment eR (hj). But increasing eR (hj) would cause the Agent to gain a lower expected
payo from eC, hence the underinvestment with respect to the full commitment case.
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2.6 Bargaining power and audit eciency
In this section we provide some extensions of the results in Proposition 3 to dierent assump-
tions about the allocation of bargaining power between the contracting parties and about the
audit eciency of the optimal contract. More precisely, we will rst characterize the optimal
contract under no commitment in the case in which player P is the contract designer and
then we will see how the allocation of bargaining power between A and P aects the eort
investment choice at stage 1. Finally, we will discuss how bargaining power aects the audit
eciency of the optimal contract.
Let us consider rst the optimal contract design problem in the case in which the Principal is
assumed to have all the bargaining power. The optimal contract eCP now solves the following
program:
Problem 6.
max
fR(mjs);R(mj)g
Z
subject to
W  0 (2.21)
 = e (2.22)
 = e (2.23)
R (mjs)  ys for m; s 2 fl; hg (2.24)
R (mj)  ym for m 2 fl; hg : (2.25)
Clearly, (2.21) is the Agent's participation constraint while (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), and (2.25)
are equivalent to the corresponding constraints in Problem 2. It is apparent that the only
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dierence between the problem above and Problem 2 is given by the objective function to
maximize.
The solution to Problem 6 is reported in the following
Proposition 4. The contract eCP = neRP (lj) ; eRP (ljl) ; eRP (ljh) ; eRP (hj)o which solves
Problem 6 is such that
 eRP (lj) = eRP (ljl) = yl,
 eRP (ljh) = eRP (hj) = yh,
 eP = 1.
The results of Proposition 4 are quite intuitive. Since the Principal operates as the contract
designer, he is able to push down the Agent's expected payo to its reservation value, i.e.
zero. More precisely, the Agent is left with an expected payo equal to zero in both states
l and h (and not only in state h as in Proposition 2). In other words, the Principal is now
able to maximize his expected payo by setting eRP (hj) = yh, so auditing with probability
1 any low-state report by player A.
As for the eort choice, it is evident that if P is the contract designer, no eort at all will
be exerted by A at stage 1. To consider a more interesting scenario, we follow [Sch12] and
assume that at stage 1 there is a probability  that the contract will be designed by player A
at stage 2 and a probability 1  that the contract designer will be player P . The probability
 can be interpreted as a measure of A's bargaining power9.
Then the eort investment problem becomes
Problem 7.
max
e2[0;1]
fW + (1  )fWP    (e) ; (2.26)
9To use [RW86]'s words, our simple scenario implies that 'the expected surplus at stage 2 is split according
to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where  is party A's bargaining power'.
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where fW is agent A's expected payo from contract eC while fWP is A's expected payo from
contract eCP , which is equal to zero.
The solution is reported in the following
Proposition 5. The eort level e which solves Problem 7 is increasing with respect to .
Moreover, if  = 0, then e = 0 and if  = 1, then e = e.
The results of the above proposition identies the so-called hold-up problem. Because of
contract incompleteness at stage 1 and relationship-specic investment, the Agent's incentive
to invest is increasing with his bargaining power. In the extreme case in which  = 0, then
A is totally held-up by the Principal and no eort will be exerted.
A further aspect to consider is the relationship between the hold-up problem and the audit
eciency of the optimal contract. The issue can be put in the following terms. When A
has no bargaining power at all, the hold-up problem arises in its most severe form because
of P 's inability to commit and the auditing ineciency10 of the resulting optimal contract.
In fact, expected auditing costs are equal to ec (1  e) under the contract eC whereas they
are equal to c (1  e) under eCP . That is, the fact that the Principal sets eRP (hj) = yh to
extract as much surplus as possible from A implies that the resulting optimal contract gives
rise to ineciently high expected auditing costs. Therefore, in order to reduce this eciency
loss and possibly mitigate the resulting hold-up problem, a benevolent planner may think of
changing the contracting terms between the parties and introduce an upper bound R < yh on
the payment R (hj) so that it has to satisfy R (hj)  R. The introduction of this payment
cap can be interpreted as a bonus that the Agent can retain in case of successful outcome of
the risky project he is endowed with.
Introducing the payment cap R, the contract design problem in the case in which P has all
the bargaining power becomes
10For a detailed analysis of auditing eciency, see [GS06]. In addition, from a normative perspective
[Cho98] shows that auditing eciency implies that the informed party should be the contract designer.
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Problem 8.
max
fR(mjs);R(mj)g
Z
subject to
W  0 (2.27)
 = e (2.28)
 = e (2.29)
R (mjs)  ys for m; s 2 fl; hg (2.30)
R (lj)  yl (2.31)
R (hj)  R < yh: (2.32)
We denote as CP the solution to this program. Furthermore, the eort choice problem would
become
Problem 9.
max
e2[0;1]
fW + (1  )W P    (e) ;
where W P is the Agent's expected payo from the contract CP .
The results are summarized in the following
Proposition 6. Suppose an upper bound R on the payment R (hj) is introduced. Then
Problem 9 is solved by the contract CP which satises
 RP (lj) = RP (ljl) = yl,
 RP (jh) = yh,
 RP (hj) = R.
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Furthermore, the eort level e that solves Problem 9 is increasing with respect to . More-
over, if  = 0, then e > 0. If  = 1, then e = e = e.
Clearly, the payment cap R is a binding constraint. Since R < yh, we also obtain that A's
expected payo from CP is positive, even though the Principal has all the bargaining power.
This fact would mitigate the hold-up problem. Indeed now we have that A's incentive to
exert eort is increasing with his bargaining power, but even in the case in which  = 0 a
positive level of eort e would be chosen. The latter result is clearly in contrast to the most
severe form of hold-up characterized in Proposition 5.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have provided the full characterization of the optimal contract between a
Principal and an Agent under the assumption that the latter can invest a non-contractible,
relationship-specic amount of eort before the contracting stage. The resulting optimal
contract shares most of the main features of the optimal mechanisms usually found in the
CSV literature. In particular, we have that the Agent is left with zero expected rent in the
low state realization and the so-called maximum punishment principle applies. Moreover, in
the case in which the Principal is not able to fully commit to the announced auditing policy,
strategic default will appear at equilibrium. However, the amount of investment cannot be
used as a commitment device and this leads to underinvestment with respect to the case with
full commitment. We have also seen how dierent allocations of bargaining power directly
aect the amount of eort invested.
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2.8 Appendix
This Appendix contains all the proofs omitted in the Chapter text.
2.8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof technique is the same as in [KP98].
The Lagrangean associated with Problem 1 is
L = e [yh  R (hj)] + (1  e) [yl   (1  )R (lj)  R (ljl)]
   [R (hj)  R (ljh)  (1  )R (lj)] (2.33)
+  feR (hj) + (1  e) [R (ljl) + (1  )R (lj)  c]g ;
where   0 and   0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (2.4)
and (2.3), respectively.
A solution
nbR (lj) ; bR (ljl) ; bR (ljh) ; bR (hj) ; b; b; bo must satisfy the following set of rst-
order conditions
@L
@R (ljh) =   0 and [yh  R (ljh)] 
@L
@R (ljh) = 0 (2.34)
@L
@R (lj) = (1  ) [+  (1  e)  (1  e)]  0 and [yl  R (lj)] 
@L
@R (lj) = 0 (2.35)
@L
@R (ljl) =   [(1  e)   (1  e)]  0 and [yl  R (ljl)] 
@L
@R (ljl) = 0 (2.36)
@L
@R (hj) = e  e    0 and [yh  R (hj)] 
@L
@R (hj) = 0 (2.37)
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@L
@
= (1  e) [R (lj) R (ljl)] +  [R (ljh) R (lj)] +  (1  e) [R (ljl) R (lj)  c]  0
and (1  )  @L
@
= 0: (2.38)
The proof continues along the following steps.
 b > 1. Condition (2.37) implies b  1 + b
e
. Clearly, if b = 1, then b = 0. By condition
(2.38), b = 1 and b = 0 imply c  0, which contradicts the assumption c > 0. b > 1
clearly implies that P 's participation constraint (2.3) is binding, i.e. P 's expected
prot is lowered until it reaches its reservation value, which is assumed to be zero.
 bR (ljl)  bR (lj). Suppose not. Then we could lower bR (ljl) and increase bR (lj) so that
expected payos remain unchanged. Due to the increase in bR (lj), the constraint (2.4)
is slack. Consequently, we can lower both b and bR (hj) so that both (2.4) and (2.3)
are satised. Contradiction.
 bR (ljl) = bR (lj) = yl. The result bR (ljl) = yl follows from b > 1, b > 0, and condition
(2.36). Furthermore, since we already know that bR (ljl)  bR (lj), by limited liability
we also obtain bR (lj) = yl.
 b < 1, b > 0, and bR (ljh) = yh. The previous result bR (ljl) = bR (lj) = yl and
(2.38) imply b > 0, which means that agent A's incentive compatibility constraint is
binding (as it usually happens in this class of problems). Consequently, if b = 1, thenbR (hj) = yh. But then the agent A receives an expected payo equal to zero while
P receives a positive expected payo, which contradicts the fact that constraint (2.3)
must be binding.
 yl < bR (hj) < yh and b = bR(hj) ylyh yl . From the previous results and the conditions (2.4)
29
and (2.3), which are binding at optimum, we get
bR (hj) = byh + (1  b) yl (2.39)
and
e bR (hj) + (1  e) (yl   bc) = 0: (2.40)
Since b 2 (0; 1), (2.39) implies that yl < bR (hj) < yh. Furthermore, solving the two
equations (2.39) and (2.40) in the two unknowns b and bR (hj) we easily obtain
b = bR (hj)  yl
yh   yl
and bR (hj) = (1  e) yl (yl   yh   c)
e (yh   yl)  (1  e) c :
2.8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Again, the proof technique is the same as in [KP98].
 First we prove eR (ljl) = yl. Since A has all the bargaining power, P 's participation
constraint must be binding, that is
Z = eR (hj) + (2.41)
+ (1  e) f(1  )R (lj) +  [ (hjl)R (ljh) + (1   (hjl))R (ljl)  c]g
= 0:
We already know that agent A mixes according to the equilibrium probability
e = eR (ljh) + (1  e)R (ljl) R (lj)  c
e [R (ljh) R (lj)  c] (2.42)
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whereas player P forms beliefs according to
 (hjl) = e (1  )
1  e : (2.43)
Substituting  (hjl) from (2.43) and  from (2.42) to (2.41) we have
Z = R (hj)  (1  e)R (lj) [R (ljl) R (ljh)]
eR (ljh) + (1  e)R (ljl) R (lj)  c = 0: (2.44)
Now we can use condition (2.10) to rewrite player A's expected payo as
W = [yh  R (hj)] + (1  e) [yl   R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)] : (2.45)
Substituting  from (2.14) and R (hj) from (2.44) in (2.45) and then dierentiating
(2.45) with respect to R (ljl), we get
@W
@R (ljl) =
c (1  e)R (lj) [R (ljh) R (lj)  c]
[c+R (lj) +R (ljl) (e  1) R (ljh) e]2 [R (ljh) R (lj)] > 0; (2.46)
where the inequality follows from the fact that e > 0.
Inequality (2.46) and limited liability imply eR (ljl) = yl.
 Now we prove eR (ljh) = yh and yl < eR (hj) < yh. Again, we can substitute  from
(2.14) and R (hj) from (2.44) in (2.45) and then dierentiate (2.45) with respect to
R (ljh) so as to obtain
@W
@R (ljh) =
c (1  e)R (lj) f[yl  R (lj)] [c+R (lj)  yl] + e [R (ljh)  yl]g2
[R (ljh) R (lj)]2 [eR (ljh) + (1  e) yl  R (lj)  c]2
> 0:
(2.47)
The latter inequality along with limited liability imply eR (ljh) = yh. Furthermore,
from (2.10) and the fact that e 2 (0; 1), it follows that yl < eR (hj) < yh.
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 To prove eR (lj) = yl we can compare the slopes of the player A's and player P 's
isoprot functions. Using eR (ljl) = yl and eR (ljh) = yh, the slope of agent A's isoprot
function in the (R (lj) ; R (hj)) space is
dR (hj)
dR (lj) =
(e  1) [yh   yl] [yh  R (hj)]
[yh  R (lj)] [eyh + (1  e) yl  R (lj)] < 0 (2.48)
Moreover,
d2R (hj)
dR (lj)2 < 0: (2.49)
As for player P 's isoprot function, its slope is
dR (hj)
dR (lj) =  
(1  e) [yh   yl] [yh  R (hj)  c]
[yh  R (lj)  c] [eyh + (1  e) yl  R (lj)  c] : (2.50)
To sign (2.50), we can observe that from P 's zero-prot condition and (2.9) we have
yh  R (hj)  c = [yh  R (lj)  c] [eyh + (1  e) yl   c]
[eyh + (1  e) yl  R (lj)  c] > 0: (2.51)
Thus, (2.50) < 0.
Now we can observe that, due to limited liability, the (R (lj) ; R (hj)) space is bounded
by yl and yh. Since yh > yl and yh > eR (hj), at the optimal solution the two isoprot
curves can either have a tangency point or cross at the corner solution R (lj) = yl.
Since a tangency can occur only if c = 0, we must have eR (lj) = yl.
 Finally, we have to show eR (hj)  bR (hj) and e  b. Let cW and fW denote agent
A's expected payo from contract bC and eC, respectively. From previous results, it is
immediate to obtain cW = e hyh   bR (hj)i
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and fW = e hyh   eR (hj)i :
Now, the lack of commitment in Problem 2 implies cW  fW , that is
e
h
yh   bR (hj)i  e hyh   eR (hj)i ;
from which it is immediate to get bR (hj)  eR (hj).
Substituting the previous results of this proposition in (2.14), it is immediate to get
e = eR (hj)  yl
yh   yl :
Using bR (hj)  eR (hj), we easily obtain
b  e:
2.8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First we prove be, e> 0.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we easily obtain
cW = e hyh   bR (hj)i
and fW = e hyh   eR (hj)i ;
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respectively.
The optimal eort levels be and e are implicitly determined by the rst-order conditions
 0 (be) = yh   bR (hj)
and
 0 (e) = yh   eR (hj) ;
respectively. Note that these conditions are not only necessary but also sucient due to the
concavity of Problems 4 and 5.
Now, recalling bR (hj) < yh from Proposition 1, eR (hj) < yh from Proposition 2, and  0 (e) >
0 for e > 0 by assumption, it follows immediately that be, e> 0.
To complete the proof, note that from Proposition 1 and 2 we can write
yh   yl > yh   bR (hj)  yh   eR (hj) :
Since  () is strictly convex by assumption, then
eFB > be  e:
2.8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Since P has all the bargaining power, agent A's participation constraint is binding. That is,
W = e f (yh  R (hj)) + (1  ) [ (yh  R (ljh)) + (1  ) (yh  R (lj))]g+
+ (1  e) f (yl  R (ljl)) + (1  ) (yl  R (lj))g
= 0: (2.52)
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Using condition (2.10), the equation above can be rewritten as
W = e [yh  R (hj)] + (1  e) [yl   R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)] = 0; (2.53)
which is equivalent to
e [yh  R (hj)] =   (1  e) [yl   R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)] : (2.54)
By limited liability, the left-hand side of (2.54) is non-negative while the right-hand side is
non-positive. Thus, in order for (2.54) to hold, both sides must be equal to zero. Conse-
quently,
yh = eRP (hj) (2.55)
and
yl = R (ljl) + (1  )R (lj) : (2.56)
The last equality, along with limited liability, implies
yl = eRP (ljl) = eRP (lj) : (2.57)
Finally, we need to prove eRP (ljh) = yh. Using eRP (hj) = yh and eRP (lj) = yl we easily
obtain
eP = yh   yleRP (ljh)  yl : (2.58)
By limited liability and by the fact that, by denition, eP 2 [0; 1], we clearly obtain
eRP (ljh) = yh; (2.59)
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which in turn implies
eP = 1:
2.8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
From Proposition 4, we easily obtain fWP = 0. Thus all the results follows immediately from
the rst-order condition
 0 (e) = 
h
yh   eR (hj)i (2.60)
to the eort choice problem and from the fact that  0 () satises  0 (0) = 0,  0 (e) > 0 for
e > 0, and  00 () > 0 by assumption.
2.8.6 Proof of Proposition 6
 First we prove the characterization of the optimal contract of Problem 8.
Note that Problem 8 is nothing other than Problem 6 expect for the introduction of the
payment cap R. It is immediate to see that payments RP (ljl), RP (ljh), and RP (lj)
are equal to the corresponding payments in Problem 6 and they are not aected by
the introduction of R. That is,
RP (ljl) = RP (ljl) = yl; RP (lj) = RP (lj) = yl; RP (ljh) = RP (ljh) = yh: (2.61)
To nd out RP (hj), we can rst use the results in (2.61) to obtain
P =
RP (hj)  yl
yh   yl ; (2.62)
P =
eyh + (1  e) yl   yl   c
e (yh   yl   c) (2.63)
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and beliefs
 (hjl) = c
yh   yl : (2.64)
Substituting in player P 's prot function yields
Z =

e (yh   yl)
yh   yl   c

RP (hj) +

1  e
yh   yl   c

[yl (yh   yl)] : (2.65)
Since yh yl > c > 0 by assumption, (2.65) is increasing with respect to RP (hj). Thus
the constraint on payment RP (hj) is binding and we clearly have RP (hj) = R.
 As for the eort level eP , the proof is analogous to that of Proposition 5 and it follows
from the rst-order condition
 0 (e) = 
h
yh   eR (hj)i+ (1  ) yh  R (2.66)
and from the convexity of  () together with the assumption R < yh.
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Chapter 3
Timing of verication, commitment,
and loan size
3.1 Introduction
The literature on Costly State Verication that originated from the seminal contributions
of [Tow79] and [GH85] has always considered verication in terms of auditing. That is, the
Principal/Financier's verication decision is commonly assumed to take place after observing
a report sent by the Agent/Borrower. This implies that the game induced by the optimal
contract is a sequential game with incomplete information. However, we may think of many
real life examples in which the verication policy is devised before observing any report, so
implying that the reporting/verication game is a simultaneous-move game of incomplete
information.
For example, following [Str05], consider an organization in which a Supervisor/Principal
delegates the functioning of a risky project to an Employee/Agent who is privately informed
about the realization of the project itself. Since exerting eort in the project is costly, the
Agent clearly has an incentive to shirk and then attribute the resulting poor performance
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to bad luck. To induce the Agent not to shirk, the Principal can choose one out of two
verication procedures. At the end of the project, she can require the Agent to report on his
activity and then, on the basis of that report, perform a costly verication. Alternatively,
she can verify the Agent's eort intensity while he is working on the project, that is, before
nal outcomes realize. The two verication procedures only dier in the timing with which
they are employed. In the rst case, the verication decision takes place after observing the
Agent's report and from now on we will call this procedure auditing. In the second case, the
verication decision is taken before observing any report from the Employee. We will use
the term monitoring to refer to the latter scenario.
Given the two verication procedures, one obvious question is: Why using monitoring in-
stead of auditing? The answer crucially depends upon the Principal's ability to commit to
the verication policy announced at the contracting stage. Suppose that Principal is able
to fully commit to the verication procedure announced at the contracting stage. Then the
optimal contract with auditing would be weakly superior to the contract with monitoring in
that the Principal can commit herself to replicate the strategy that would have been used
under monitoring. Nonetheless, this means that the Principal commit herself to disregard
the additional information that she will receive by observing the Agent's report, which is a
dynamic inconsistent choice or, in other words, a non-credible threat. On the other hand, by
removing the full commitment assumption [Str05] shows that, under some circumstances, the
optimal contract with monitoring can be a Pareto improving with respect to the contract
under auditing. In particular, [Str05] shows that without commitment the double moral
hazard1 problem with auditing is more severe than with monitoring. Namely, providing in-
centive for the Principal to audit requires "steeper incentives", i.e. larger payments to the
Agent, than under monitoring.
1That is, moral hazard for the Agent that would try to shirk instead of working and moral hazard for the
Principal that would save on verication costs by not monitoring/auditing.
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In this chapter we put aside the comparison2 between monitoring and auditing and consider
a lender/borrower relationship in which the lender can only use monitoring as a verication
procedure. Furthermore, we will consider two dierent scenarios: one in which the Principal
is able to fully commit to the verication policy announced at the contracting stage and
another scenario where such an ability to commit is assumed away.
We will show that the optimal contract under full commitment prescribes a null expected
rent to the Agent if the low state of the world realizes along with the so-called maximum pun-
ishment principle3, that is, the Agent must give his entire wealth to the Principal if caught
cheating. Furthermore, the Agent will be left with a positive rent (bonus) if he truthfully
reports the higher state of the world. In the case without commitment, we will show that
the optimal contract will inherit all the main features of the contract under full commitment
but with two relevant dierences. First, the expected rent for the Agent in the high state
is lower. Second, the loan size acts as a commitment device and therefore turns out to be
larger in the case in which full commitment to verication policies is assumed away.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest paper to this chapter are [KP98] and [Str05].
The modelling framework that we will use is essentially the same as that of [KP98]. How-
ever, the key dierence is that we assume that the only verication procedure available is
monitoring whereas [KP98] assume that only auditing is available. As we will discuss later,
many results of [KP98] carry over to our scenario. In particular, we will show how their
result on the loan size as a commitment device is still valid under monitoring.
Our denition of monitoring and auditing is taken from [Str05]. In particular, he considers
a framework with (ex ante) moral hazard and nds conditions under which monitoring is
2The reason why we only consider monitoring can be justied in terms of higher costs that the Principal
has to sustain in order to use auditing. For example, we may think that collecting reports before auditing
is costly due to the necessity of hiring additional employees. This become even more relevant if we extend
our analysis in such a way to consider a nancial intermediary that lends its funds to a larger number of
borrowers.
3See, for instance, [BS87].
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more ecient than auditing. However, we consider a framework with ex post moral hazard
and conne our attention to monitoring procedures.
As for the dierent assumptions about commitment and the use of stochastic contracts, at
least since [MP89] the literature on Costly State Verication has established that stochastic
contracts usually outperform deterministic mechanisms, namely standard debt contracts.
However, [KV00] have shown that deterministic mechanisms turn out to be optimal even
under no commitment if one introduces enforcement as a decision variable. Nonetheless,
since our analysis will not focus on (costly) enforcement, we consider a static environment
a la [MP89] in which stochastic contracts turn out to be optimal if the assumption of full
commitment is removed.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we set up the model and provide a full
characterization of the monitoring game induced by a given contract. Section 3.3 charac-
terizes the optimal contract between the lender and the borrower in the case in which the
former is able to fully commit to the monitoring policy announced at the contracting stage.
The optimal contract under the hypothesis of no commitment is characterized in Section 3.4.
Then conclusions follow.
3.2 The model
Let us consider an economy with one cashless Agent or Entrepreneur A (he) and a (possibly)
innite number of Principals of Financiers (she) that operate in a perfectly competitive
market for lending funds. The Agent is endowed with a risky production technology which
transforms input capital I 2 0; I into output yh (I) with probability p 2 (0; 1) or yl (I)
with probability (1  p). The production function y () satises the standard assumptions
of monotonicity and concavity, i.e. y0 () > 0 and y00 () < 0. Furthermore, following [KP98],
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for every I 2 0; I the production technology satises the following conditions:
yh (I) > I > yl (I) ; y
0
h (I) > 1 > y
0
l (I) ; and pyh (I) + (1  p) yl (I) > I;
which ensure that nancing the Agent's project has a positive net present value. To nance
her project, the Agent tries to collect funds by making a take-it-or-leave-it oer to one
Principal or Financier4.
Information is asymmetrically distributed across market participants. Once a contract has
been signed, the Agent privately observes the true state of the world s 2 fl; hg and prepares
a report y^m 2 fyl (I) ; yh (I)g to be send to the Principal. On the other hand, the principal
simultaneously chooses a monitoring intensity  with which the report received from the
borrower will be veried. This means that the Principal is endowed with a perfect verication
technology that allows him to discover the true state of the world at a cost 0 < c < yh (I) 
yl (I).
A contract is thus a list of repayment functions R (mjs) and R (mj) along with the loan size
I, where R (mjs) is the repayment in the case in which the state m 2 fl; hg is reported and
the true state s 2 fl; hg is discovered with verication while R (mj) is the repayment when
m 2 fl; hg is reported and no verication occurs. The Agent is protected by limited liability,
so that R (mj)  ym and R (mjs)  ys, for m; s 2 fl; hg. Clearly, if verication were not
possible, the Agent would always claim a low output realization. Consequently, the contract
should be designed in such a way to induce the borrower to truthfully report not only the
low state but also the high state output realization.
The sequence of events is the following:
 Stage 1: A makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract oer to P specifying loan size I and
payments R (mj) and R (mjs)
4We work under the assumption of exclusive nancial contracts, that is, the borrower is allowed to sign
nancial contracts with only one lender.
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 Stage 2: If the contract oer is refuted, then the game end and both players are left
with zero utility. Otherwise, A privately observes the true state of the world and sends
a reports to P ; at the same time P decides whether to monitor or not the report that
will be sent by A
 Stage 3: Final payments take place
The sequence of events is also reported in Figure 3.1.
1 2 3
Contract
Design
Output realization; Monitoring
and reporting decisions
Final
Payments
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events with monitoring
As a benchmark, notice that under complete and symmetric information the states of the
world become common knowledge and the rst-best loan size I will be achieved. In partic-
ular, I is the loan size that maximizes the social surplus
pyh (I) + (1  p) yl (I)  I
and is implicitly determined by the rst-order condition
py0h (I) + (1  p) y0l (I) = 1:
3.2.1 The monitoring game
Let us consider an arbitrary contract C = fI; R (lj) ; R (ljl) ; R (hj) ; R (hjh) ; R (hjl) ; R (ljh)g.
This contract induces a simultaneous-move game of incomplete information. To simplify
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things and avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that the incentive for the Agent to lie arises
only if a high output realization occurs. In other words, when a low state is observed, then A
always sends a truthful report. But when a state h realizes, then he tries to take advantage
of the Principal by claiming that the project produced a low output.
The monitoring game induced by a given contract C is a simultaneous-move game of incom-
plete information. Players, Actions, beliefs, payos.
The set of players is N = fA;Pg, where A is the Agent and P is the Principal.
The type space for player A is A = fl; hg while his action set is SA = fy^l; y^hg. Conse-
quently, a (possibly mixed) strategy for the Agent is a mapping A : A ! (SA).
The action set for P is SP = fMonitor;Don't Monitorg and a (possibly mixed) strategy is
P 2 (SP ).
Due to the simultaneous occurrence of moves, the Principal's prior beliefs about A's type
are given by the probability distribution over the set of states. That is,  (h) = p and
 (l) = 1  p, where  (s) denote the Principal's belief of facing type s of player A.
Abusing notation, let A = (A (h) ; 1  A (h) ; A (l) ; 1  A (l)) be a mixed strategy for
player A, where A (s) is the probability of sending the truthful report y^s. Similarly, let
P = (; 1  ) be a mixed strategy for player P , where  indicates the probability of mon-
itoring the Agent's report.
To simplify notation, introduce  := A (h).
Given C, expected payos are
W = (1  p) [yl (I)  R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)]
+ pf [ (yh (I) R (hjh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (hj))] (3.1)
+ (1  ) [ (yh (I) R (ljh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (lj))]g
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for player A and
Z =  f(1  p)R (ljl) + p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (ljh)]  cg (3.2)
+ (1  ) fpR (hj) + (1  p)R (lj)g ;
for player P .
The natural solution concept to use is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). Recall that a
BNE is a strategy prole and a belief system that maximize every player's expected payo
given his or her beliefs about other players' types and given other player's strategies.
Lemma 1. The (unique) Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the monitoring game is the strategy
prole (A; 

P ) = ((
; 1  ; 1; 0) ; (; 1  )) such that
 =
(1  p)R (ljl) + pR (ljh) R (lj)  c
p [R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh) R (lj)] (3.3)
and
 =
R (hj) R (lj)
R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh) R (lj) : (3.4)
The associated belief system is given by ( (h) ;  (l)) = (p; 1  p).
Notice that the monitoring probability is independent of the verication cost c while the
probability of truthfully reporting the high state h is decreasing with respect to c. Intuitively,
if the verication cost increases, even though the monitoring intensity is unaected, the
Principal will have to sustain a higher cost to monitor. Anticipating this, the Agent will
react at equilibrium by decreasing . Notice that, independently of c, at every equilibrium
strategic default will appear with positive probability.
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3.3 Optimal contract with full commitment to moni-
toring
In this section we characterize the optimal contract under the assumption that, at the con-
tracting stage, the Principal can fully commit to a pre-specied (and possibly random)
monitoring policy. We denote by bC the resulting contract and we will use throughout the
superscript b to indicate relevant variables in the full commitment case.
In this case, a contract is a list of repayment functions bR (mjs) and bR (mj), a monitoring
schedule b, and the loan size bI. bR (mjs) is the repayment from party A to party P if the
state m 2 M is reported and the true state s 2 S is discovered by the Principal using the
(perfect) verication technology he is endowed with. bR (mj) is the repayment to P in the
case in which m is reported and no auditing occurs, while b is the probability with which P
will monitor the reported state m.
Thus a contract is a list bC = nbI; bR (lj) ; bR (ljl) ; bR (ljh) ; bR (hj) ; bR (hjh) ; bo. Notice that,
due to the hypothesis of simultaneous monitoring and reporting decisions, both low state
and high state reports can possibly be veried.
Since we are working under the full commitment assumption, we can make use of the Revela-
tion Principle and then conne our attention to direct truthful mechanisms. In other words,
without loss of generality we can consider contracts for which the Agent is asked to report his
private information, i.e. the state s, and truthful reporting is optimal at equilibrium. This
implies that, given an arbitrary contract C = fI; R (lj) ; R (ljl) ; R (ljh) ; R (hj) ; R (hjh) ; g,
by the revelation principle, player A's expected payo from C is
W = p [yh (I)  R (hjh)  (1  )R (hj)] + (1  p) [yl (I)  R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)]
(3.5)
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while player P 's expected (gross) payo is
Z = p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (hj)] + (1  p) [R (ljl) + (1  )R (lj)]  c: (3.6)
Without loss of generality, the Principal's reservation utility is set equal to I. Furthermore,
we assume that player A has all the bargaining power and acts as the contract designer.
The optimal contract bC is the solution to the following program
Problem 10.
max
fI;R(mjs);R(mj);g
W
subject to
Z  I (3.7)
R (hjh) + (1  )R (hj)  R (ljh) + (1  )R (lj) (3.8)
R (mjs)  ys (I) for m; s 2 fl; hg (3.9)
R (mj)  ym (I) for m 2 fl; hg ; (3.10)
where (3.7) is the Principal's participation constraint, (3.8) is the Agent's incentive compat-
ibility (or truth-telling) constraint, (3.9) and (3.10) are the limited liability constraints.
The solution to the above problem is reported in the following
Proposition 7. The contract bC = nbI; bR (lj) ; bR (ljl) ; bR (ljh) ; bR (hjh) ; bR (hj) ; bo which
solves Problem 10 is such that:
 bR (lj) = bR (ljl) = yl (I),
 bR (ljh) = yh (I),
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 yl (I) < bR (hj) ; bR (hjh) < yh (I),
 b = bR(hj) yl(I)
yh(I) yl(I)+ bR(hj)  bR(hjh) < 1,
 bI < I.
Three properties of the above proposition are worth noticing. First, the Agent is left with an
expected rent equal to zero in the low state l. Second, the so-called maximum punishment
principles applies. That is, if the Agent is caught cheating by sending a fraudulent report
on the state h, he is called upon to repay the highest possible level of wealth yh (I). These
two properties are also shared by the optimal contract with auditing5. Finally, the fact thatbR (hjh) < yh (I) means that, in case of truthful report of the high state h the Agent is
left with a positive expected rent which can be interpreted as a bonus left to A to reward
his honest behaviour. The latter property is in sharp contrast with the properties of the
optimal contract with auditing and is a direct consequence of our assumption of simultaneous
monitoring and reporting.
3.4 Optimal contract without commitment to monitor-
ing
In this section we provide the full characterization of the optimal contract eC between parties
A and P under the assumption that, at the contracting stage, party P cannot commit herself
not to renegotiate the monitoring policy announced in stage 1. We use the superscript e to
denote all relevant variables under no commitment.
The reason why we also consider the scenario without commitment rests upon the inherent
dynamic inconsistency of the optimal contract under full commitment. In fact, let us con-
sider the scenario outlined in the previous section. Once the terms of the optimal contract
5See, among others, [KP98], [Boy01], and [Cho98].
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have been agreed upon by both parties, the Agent will truthfully report the observed state of
the world and then the Principal will monitor according to the pre-announced, equilibrium
monitoring policy b. Clearly, the Principal would not have any incentive ex post to monitor
because he knows for sure that A's reports are truthful and because verication is costly.
Furthermore, the Agent may anticipate P 's incentive not to monitor and then she may try
to take advantage of the Principal by sending fraudulent reports. In other words, the P 's
promise to commit to the announced policy b is not credible. Without the full commitment
assumption, we thus consider the same scenario with strategic monitoring outlined in section
3.2.1 and we will try to determine an optimal contract which is also renegotiation-proof.
Having in mind the reporting game described before, we have that a contract eC has to specify
ve payments:
neR (ljl) ; eR (ljh) ; eR (lj) ; eR (hj) ; eR (hjh)o along with the loan size eI. Clearly,
the no commitment assumption implies that any monitoring policy announced by the Prin-
cipal in the contracting stage cannot be contracted upon.
Given an arbitrary contract eC = neI; eR (lj) ; eR (ljl) ; eR (ljh) ; eR (hj) ; eR (hjh)o, player A's ex-
pected payo from C is
W = (1  p) [yl (I)  R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)]
+ pf [ (yh (I) R (hjh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (hj))] (3.11)
+ (1  ) [ (yh (I) R (ljh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (lj))]g
while agent P 's expected payo is
Z =  f(1  p)R (ljl) + p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (ljh)]  cg (3.12)
+ (1  ) fpR (hj) + (1  p)R (lj)g :
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Clearly, removing the full commitment assumption entails that the revelation principle can
no longer be used6.
As we already did in the full commitment case, we assume that the Agent has all the
bargaining power and act as the contract designer.
The optimal contract eC is the solution to the following program
Problem 11.
max
fI;R(mjs);R(mj)g
W
subject to
Z  I (3.13)
 =  (3.14)
 =  (3.15)
R (mjs)  ys (I) for m; s 2 fl; hg (3.16)
R (mj)  ym (I) for m 2 fl; hg ; (3.17)
where (3.13) is the Principal's participation constraint while (3.16) and (3.17) are the lim-
ited liability constraints. (3.14) and (3.15) ensure equilibrium play in the monitoring game
induced by the contract eC. The solution eC to the program above is reported in the following
Proposition 8. The contract eC = neI; eR (lj) ; eR (ljl) ; eR (ljh) ; eR (hj) ; eR (hjh)o which solves
Problem 11 is such that:
 eR (lj) = eR (ljl) = yl (I),
6To be fully rigorous, we can show that a modied version of the Revelation Principle applies to the case
without commitment (See for instance [BS01] and [BS07]). In particular, [BS07] show that the revelation
principle continues to hold provided that a noisy communication device is used. Given the simultaneous-
move assumption of our model and to simplify things, we follow [Kha97] and [KP98] and work without the
revelation principle.
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 eR (ljh) = yh (I),
 yl (I) < eR (hj) ; eR (hjh) < yh (I).
Furthermore, the following inequalities hold:
 bI < eI < I,
 b bR (hjh) + (1  b) bR (hj) < e eR (hjh) + (1  e) eR (hj).
The results of the above proposition show that the optimal contract without commitment
inherits all the main features of the contract under full commitment characterized in the
previous section. That is, also in Proposition 8 the maximum punishment principle applies
and the Agent is left with a null expected rent in the low state l. Moreover, the Agent
is rewarded with a positive rent for truthfully reporting the high state h. However, the
striking dierence between Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 is contained in the last two
items of the latter. In particular, the absence of commitment implies that to induce the
Principal to perform monitoring, she must receive higher payments in the high state h.
Clearly, this corresponds to a lower expected payo from the optimal contract for the Agent.
Furthermore, the Principal's inability to commit aects the loan size. In particular, the fact
that eI is greater than bI suggests that the loan size acts as a commitment device. In other
words, the higher the amount of funds at stake, the more credible is the monitoring threat of
the Principle because the higher would be the loss she sustains in case of fraudulent report.
This results resembles that of [KP98] and shows that the key point of their analysis is still
valid in a framework with monitoring.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have provided the full characterization of the optimal contract between a
lender a borrower under monitoring, i.e. under the hypothesis that verication and reporting
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decisions are taken simultaneously and not sequentially. We have shown that the resulting
mechanisms inherits many features of the optimal contracts with auditing. Nonetheless,
contrary to what is usually found with sequential decisions, we have seen how the presence
of monitoring entails a positive bonus to the Agent in the case in which he truthfully reports
a high state of the world. Moreover, then standard result of [KP98] on the loan size as
commitment device also applies in our scenario. It would be interesting to extend our
analysis and make a comparison between monitoring and auditing similar to that of [Str05]
and see how the corresponding loans sizes would behave.
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3.6 Appendix
This Appendix contains all the proofs omitted in the Chapter text.
3.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
For completeness, the following two tables report all possible payos of the monitoring game
in the case in which the true state of the world is s = h and s = l, respectively.
s = h
A's action P 's action A's payo P 's payo
y^l Monitor yh (I) R (ljh) R (ljh)  c
y^l Don't Monitor yh (I) R (lj) R (lj)
y^h Monitor yh (I) R (hjh) R (hjh)  c
y^h Don't Monitor yh (I) R (hj) R (hj)
s = l
A's action P 's action A's payo P 's payo
y^l Monitor yl (I) R (ljl) R (ljl)  c
y^l Don't Monitor yl (I) R (lj) R (lj)
y^h Monitor yl (I) R (hjl) R (hjl)  c
y^h Don't Monitor yl (I) R (hj) R (hj)
Note that assuming the Agent always truthfully reports the low state s = l amounts to
assuming R (hjl) + (1  )R (hj)  R (ljl) ; R (lj) ; 8 2 [0; 1].
It is obvious that the BNE of our monitoring game is a mixed-strategy equilibrium7. The
intuition why we cannot have a pure strategy equilibrium is straightforward. Roughly speak-
ing, suppose that (all types of) player A always reports truthfully, so that P 's best response
7To be fully rigorous, we have a hybrid equilibrium in which the low type of player A always plays y^l
while both the high type of player A and player P randomize according to  and , respectively. See on this
[Str05] and the references therein.
54
is not to monitor. But then truthfully reporting is no longer optimal and A would have
an incentive to deviate. On the other hand, suppose that P always monitors so that A's
best response is to truthfully report. But then P would have an incentive to deviate, the
monitoring technology being costly to use. The remaining cases are similar.
The equilibrium characterization follows directly from the property that, in a mixed strategy
equilibrium, each (type of each) player must be indierent between his or her pure strategies
that will be played with positive probability at equilibrium8. This means that, at equi-
librium, the (high type of the) Agent must be indierent between truthfully reporting the
high state h and sending a fraudulent report while the Principal must be indierent between
monitoring and not monitoring. Formally,
 [yh (I) R (hjh)]+(1  ) [yh (I) R (hj)] =  [yh (I) R (ljh)]+[yh (I) R (lj)] (3.18)
and
(1  p) [R (ljl)  c] + p f [R (hjh)  c] + (1  ) [R (ljh)  c]g =
= (1  p)R (lj) + p fR (hj) + (1  )R (lj)g : (3.19)
The Left-Hand Side of (3.18) is the expected payo from truthfully reporting the state s = h
while the Right-Hand Side is the expected payo from sending a fraudulent report. The LHS
of (3.19) is the expected payo from monitoring while the RHS is the expected payo from
not monitoring.
Solving (3.18) for  and (3.19) for  yields
 =
R (hj) R (lj)
R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh) R (lj) (3.20)
8For a formal proof, see for instance Lemma 33.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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and
 =
(1  p)R (ljl) + pR (ljh) R (lj)  c
p [R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh) R (lj)] ; (3.21)
respectively.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Recalling that
W = p [yh (I)  R (hjh)  (1  )R (hj)] + (1  p) [yl (I)  R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)]
(3.22)
and
Z = p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (hj)] + (1  p) [R (ljl) + (1  )R (lj)]  c; (3.23)
the Lagrangian of problem (10) is
L = p [yh (I)  R (hjh)  (1  )R (hj)] + (1  p) [yl (I)  R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)]
   [R (hjh) + (1  )R (hj)  R (ljh)  (1  )R (lj)] (3.24)
+  fp [R (hjh) + (1  )R (hj)] + (1  p) [R (ljl) + (1  )R (lj)]  c  Ig ;
where  and  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the Agent's incentive compati-
bility (or truth-telling) constraint and the Principal's participation constraint, respectively.
The corresponding rst-order conditions are
@L
@I
= py0h (I) + (1  p) y0l (I)   = 0 (3.25)
@L
@R (ljh) =   0 and [yh (I) R (ljh)] 
@L
@R (ljh) = 0 (3.26)
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@L
@R (lj) = (1  ) [+  (1  p)  (1  p)]  0 and [yl (I) R (ljl)] 
@L
@R (lj) = 0 (3.27)
@L
@R (ljl) =   [(1  p)   (1  p)]  0 and [yl (I) R (ljl)] 
@L
@R (ljl) = 0 (3.28)
@L
@R (hj) = (1  ) [p  p  ]  0 and [yh (I) R (hj)] 
@L
@R (hj) = 0 (3.29)
@L
@R (hjh) =  [p  p  ]  0 and [yh (I) R (hjh)] 
@L
@R (hjh) = 0 (3.30)
@L
@
= p [R (hj) R (hjh)] + (1  p) [R (lj) R (ljl)] (3.31)
+  [R (hj) R (hjh) +R (ljh) R (lj)]
+  fp [R (hjh) R (hj)] + (1  p) [R (ljl) R (lj)]  cg  0
and (1  )  @L
@
= 0:
The proof continues along the following steps.
 b > 0. Since p 2 [0; 1] and y0l (I) ; y0h (I) > 0 by assumption, from (3.25) we easily
obtain b > 0. As expected, this means that P 's participation constraint is binding.
 b > 1 and b > 0. Adding up constraints (3.29) and (3.30) we obtain bp   p   b  0,
which is equivalent to b  1 + b
p
, hence b  1. Clearly, if b = 1, then b = 0. By
condition (3.31), b = 1 along with b = 0 imply c  0, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, b > 1 and consequently b > 0. The latter inequality means that the
Agent's incentive compatibility constraint is binding, hence b bR (hjh)+(1  b) bR (hj) =
b bR (ljh) + (1  b) bR (lj).
 bR (ljl) = yl (I). Using b > 0 and b > 1 in (3.28) we have @L@R(ljl) > 0 and by the
corresponding complementary slackness condition we can conclude that bR (ljl) = yl (I).
 bR (ljh) = yh (I). Using b > 0 and b > 0 in (3.26) we easily obtain @L@R(ljh) > 0, hence
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bR (ljh) = yh (I).
 b < 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that b = 1. Then by previous results and
by the Agent's participation constraint (which is binding) we easily obtain bR (hjh) =bR (ljh) = yh (I). But then, using bR (ljl) = yl (I) and bR (ljh) = yh (I), A's expected
payo turns out to be equal to zero, i.e. W = 0, while the Principal would get a net
positive payo. Indeed we have Z = pyh (I) + (1  p) yl (I)   c > L. Recall that the
net social surplus pyh (I)+(1  p) yl (I) c L is positive by assumption. Now, Z > L
contradicts b > 0. Then we conclude that b < 1.
 bR (lj) = yl (I). Using b 2 (0; 1), b > 0 and b > 1, by condition (3.27) it follows that
@L
@R(lj) > 0. By the associated complementary slackness condition, we easily obtainbR (lj) = yl (I).
 b = bR(hj) yl(I)
yh(I) yl(I)+ bR(hj)  bR(hjh) . It suces to take the binding incentive compatibility con-
straint
b bR (hjh) + (1  b) bR (hj) = byh (I) + (1  b) yl (I) ;
then solving for b yields
b = bR (hj)  yl (I)
yh (I)  yl (I) + bR (hj)  bR (hjh) :
 yl (I) < bR (hjh) ; bR (hj) < yh (I). Given b 2 (0; 1), it follows that bR (hjh) < yh (I)
and yl (I) < bR (hj). Then, using b < 1, bR (hjh) < yh (I) and yl (I) < bR (hj) in the
incentive compatibility constraint
b bR (hjh) + (1  b) bR (hj) = byh (I) + (1  b) yl (I)
we nally get yl (I) < bR (hj) < yh (I) and yl (I) < bR (hjh) < yh (I).
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 bI < I. Notice that I maximizes the social welfare
pyh (I) + (1  p) yl (I)  I
and is implicitly determined by the rst-order condition
py0h (I
) + (1  p) y0l (I)  1 = 0; (3.32)
whereas bI is implicitly determined by (3.25). Comparing (3.32) with (3.25) and usingb > 1 along with the assumptions of strict monotonicity and strict concavity of the
technology yields the result.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 8
We organize the proof in several steps. First of all, the players' expected payos under no
commitment are
W = (1  p) [yl (I)  R (ljl)  (1  )R (lj)]
+ pf [ (yh (I) R (hjh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (hj))] (3.33)
+ (1  ) [ (yh (I) R (ljh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (lj))]g
and
Z =  f(1  p)R (ljl) + p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (ljh)]  cg (3.34)
+ (1  ) fpR (hj) + (1  p)R (lj)g ;
respectively.
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 As it is common in this class of problems, we know that the Agent will be left with
zero rent in the low state, hence eR (lj) = eR (ljl) = yl (I) must hold. Then expected
payos become
W = pf [ (yh (I) R (hjh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (hj))] (3.35)
+ (1  ) [ (yh (I) R (ljh)) + (1  ) (yh (I) R (lj))]g
for A and
Z =  f(1  p) yl (I) + p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (ljh)]  cg (3.36)
+ (1  ) fpR (hj) + (1  p)R (lj)g
for P .
Moreover, since A has all the bargaining power, the Principal's Participation constraint
must be binding, that is
Z =  f(1  p) yl (I) + p [R (hjh) + (1  )R (ljh)]  cg (3.37)
+ (1  ) fpR (hj) + (1  p)R (lj)g = I:
Notice that, using condition (3.18), the expected payo (3.35) can be rewritten as
W = p [yh (I)  R (hjh)  (1  )R (hj)] (3.38)
while using condition (3.19), the expected payo (3.37) can be rewritten as
Z = [pR (hj) + (1  p) yl (I)]  I = 0: (3.39)
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Solving (3.39) for R (hj), plugging in (3.38) and using (3.21) yields
W = p
(
yh (I) R (hjh)  R (hj)  yl (I)
R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)
  R (ljh) R (hjh)
R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I) 


I [R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)]
(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c (3.40)
  yl (I)  R (hj) R (hjh) + (1  p) [R (ljh)  yl (I)]
(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c
)
:
The rst derivative of (3.40) with respect to R (ljh) is
@W
@R (ljh) = p
(
R (hjh) [R (hj)  yl (I)] [R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)]
[R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)]2
  R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)  [R (ljh) R (hjh)]
[R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)]2



I [R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)]
(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c
  yl (I)  R (hj) R (hjh) + (1  p) [R (ljh)  yl (I)]
(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c

(3.41)
  R (ljh) R (hjh)
R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I) 


I [(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c]  pI [R (hj) +R (ljh) R (hjh)  yl (I)]
[(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c]2
  yl (I)  (1  p)R (ljh)  p fR (hj) R (hjh) + (1  p) [R (ljh)  yl (I)]g
[(1  p) yl (I) + pR (ljh)  yl (I)  c]2
)
> 0;
where the inequality follows from p 2 (0; 1), R (hj) > yl (I), and R (ljh) > R (hjh).
The sign of this derivative along with limited liability yields eR (ljh) = yh (I).
 The proof of yl (I) < eR (hj) ; eR (hjh) < yh (I) is identical to that provided for Propo-
sition 7.
 To prove eI < I, see [KP98].
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 To prove eI > bI, we proceed as in [KP98].
First notice that the rst-order condition (3.25) can be rewritten as
p
1
^
y0h

I^

+ (1  p) 1
^
y0l

I^

= 1: (3.42)
From constraint (3.31) we have
p
h bR (hj)  bR (hjh)i+ b h bR (hj)  bR (hjh) + yh I^  yl I^i+ (3.43)
+bnp h bR (hjh)  bR (hj)i  co = 0
From conditions (3.29) and (3.30) we get
b = bp  p: (3.44)
Substituting (3.44) in (3.43) and solving for b yields
b = p

yh

I^

  yl

I^

p

yh

I^

  yl

I^

  c
: (3.45)
As for the problem under no commitment, we can rewrite Problem 11 as
max
fIg
pyh (I) + (1  p) yl (I)  I
subject to
 = 
so that the corresponding rst-order condition is
py0h

~I

+ (1  p) y0l

~I

+ p
@
@I
yh

~I

  p@

@I
yl

~I

= 1: (3.46)
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Subtracting the LHS of (3.46) from the LHS of (3.43) and evaluating the dierence at
I = eI, we obtain
p
1

y0h (I) + (1  p)
1

y0l (I)  [py0h (I) + (1  p) y0l (I)]  p
@
@I
[yh (I)  yl (I)] ; (3.47)
where we dropped the superscript e to simplify notation. It follows that if (3.47) < 0,
then eI > bI.
Let us rewrite (3.47) as

1

  

py0h (I) +

1

(1  p)  (1  p)

y0l (I)  p
@
@I
[yh (I)  yl (I)] : (3.48)
To save on notation let us dene
H := R (hj) R (hjh)
and
y := yh (I)  yl (I) :
Using (3.45) and (3.21) we get
1

   = H (py   c)
py (H +y)
; (3.49)
1

(1  p)  (1  p) = 1

  1  p

1

  

(3.50)
=
pH (c y)  c (H +y)
py (H +y)
;
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and
@
@I
=
@
@I
 py   c
p (y +H)
(3.51)
=
[y0h (I)  y0l (I)] (pH + c)
p (H +y)2
: (3.52)
Substituting into (3.48) we obtain
y0h (I)
H (py   c)
y (H +y)
+ y0l (I)
pH (c y)  c (H +y)
py (H +y)
 y [y
0
h (I)  y0l (I)] (pH + c)
(H +y)2
(3.53)
which is equivalent to
py0h (I) (H +y)H (py   c)
py (H +y)2
(3.54)
+
y0l (I) (H +y) [pH (c y)  c (H +y)]
py (H +y)2
 p (y)
2 [y0h (I)  y0l (I)] (pH + c)
py (H +y)2
:
Now, if c = 0, then (3.54) becomes
y0h (I) p (H +y)Hpy   y0l (I) (H +y) (pyH)  p (y)2 (y0h (I)  y0l (I)) pH
py (H +y)2
< 0;
(3.55)
where the inequality follows from the assumptions y0h (I) > y
0
l (I), y > 0, and p 2
(0; 1).
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If c = y, then (3.54) becomes
  y
0
h (I) p (H +y)H [y (1  p)] + y0l (H +y) [y (H +y)]
py (H +y)2
(3.56)
  p (y)
2 [y0h (I)  y0l (I)] (pH +y)
py (H +y)2
< 0:
Furthermore, the derivative of (3.54) with respect to c is
 y0h (I) p (H +y)H p (y)2 [y0h (I)  y0l (I)]+pHy0l (H +y) y0l (I) (H +y)2 < 0:
(3.57)
Recalling that 0 < c < y by assumption, the latter results means that there is no
value of c such that (3.47) is non-negative, so establishing the result
 Finally, we have to prove that
e eR (hjh) + (1  e) eR (hj) > b bR (hjh) + (1  b) bR (hj) : (3.58)
Notice that the Agent's expected prot under full commitment is
cW = p hyh I^  b bR (hjh)  (1  b) bR (hj)i > 0 (3.59)
whereas he gets
fW = p hyh ~I  e eR (hjh)  (1  e) eR (hj)i > 0 (3.60)
without commitment.
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The denition of commitment implies
p
h
yh

I^

  b bR (hjh)  (1  b) bR (hj)i  p hyh ~I  e eR (hjh)  (1  e) eR (hj)i ;
(3.61)
which can be rewritten as
e eR (hjh) + (1  e) eR (hj)  b bR (hjh)  (1  b) bR (hj)  yh ~I  yh I^ > 0; (3.62)
where the last equality comes from bI < eI and the assumption y0 () > 0.
Thus we easily obtain both
e eR (hjh) + (1  e) eR (hj) > b bR (hjh) + (1  b) bR (hj) (3.63)
and cW > fW: (3.64)
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